This dissertation will focus on common intention constructive trusts in relation to shared ownership of the family home predominantly in relation to unmarried couples. These trusts are particularly important because as opposed to married couples where the court may determine a couple's financial and property issues upon divorce using the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the position of unmarried couples is not covered by any legislation and so judges need to refer back to case law and property law in order to establish the equitable ownership of property.
In Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co
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1 [1999] 3 . Although there are many different types of constructive trusts, the following categories are the most significant: a breach of fiduciary duty, theft, receipt of property by mistake, fraud, and assistance in a breach of a trust 4 . This dissertation will focus on common intention constructive trusts in relation to shared ownership of the family home predominantly in relation to unmarried couples. These trusts are particularly important because as opposed to married couples where the court may determine a couple's financial and property issues upon divorce using the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the position of unmarried couples is not covered by any legislation and so judges need to refer back to case law and property law in order to establish the equitable ownership of property. does not apply to modern cases involving family home trusts 7 . There are many social issues surrounding common intention constructive trusts in relation to cohabitation of unmarried couples. In the recent years, it has become socially acceptable for unmarried couples (heterosexual and homosexual) to live together either for convenience or out of sexual desire with no intention of forming a permanent relationship. People may simply share accommodation which they have bought in joint names. It is no longer the case that men make more financial contributions towards property than women. However, in many cases women who have decided 2 Ibid. 3 LJ Edmund Davies in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co [1969] 2 Ch 276 at 300. 4 A. Hudson, Equity and Trusts, 7th ed., Routledge, 2012, p. 549-553. 5 [1970] AC 777. 6 Presumption of advancement in cases involving husband and wife means that where a husband made a transfer of property to his wife, the presumption was that the husband intended to make an outright gift of such property -Tinker v Tinker [1970] to stay home and take care of children have been in an economically disadvantageous position because, while caring for the offspring, they were unable to make financial contributions towards the property 8 . People who trust each other tend not to make formal agreements and this can later cause difficulties in establishing the equitable ownership of the property. Also, people's views may change over time and they may decide to separate, move out or leave their cohabitee. They may also go through many life experiences which they often have not predicted such as redundancy, poverty, illness, accident, sudden enrichment, children conceived by accident, or bad luck 9 . No matter what the situation is, parties demonstrate a variety of intentions while cohabiting together and some of them can give rise to establishing an equitable interest in property.
The most straightforward situation for courts to decide is where there has been an 'express trust' 10 declared that allocates the entire equitable interest in the property between the parties 11 . In Goodman v Gallant
12
there was an express trust declared which provided that the property was to be held on trust for the parties as joint tenants. It was held that although there were different financial contributions made by the parties towards the estate, the appellant took only half of the interest in the property as the "declaration contained in the document [spoke] for itself " 13 . However if there is no express trust declared, the courts will have to look at the parties' intentions to decide who ought to acquire rights in the home in order to prevent mortgagees from repossessing it, to decide who should continue to live in it, how to divide proceeds of sale, or to prevent third parties from purchasing it.
The development of the case law in relation to common intention constructive trusts started in 1970s with cases such as Pettitt v Pettitt 14 where the House of Lords " [began] the process of staking out the modern code of rules to deal with the allocation of equitable interests in the family home..."
15 .
However, it was Lord Diplock in Gissing v Gissing
16 who first introduced the concept of 'common intention', which provided judges with greater discretion in making decisions and it opened the way for the use of the constructive trust to declare rights in land. Also, the decision created the possibility for courts to look behind the parties' formal legal arrangements in the search for their common intentions. where he redrew the test on which basis a common intention constructive trust would be formed. According to Lord Bridge, there were two different forms of common intention constructive trusts: common intention based on conduct and common intention based on agreement 23 . Common intention evidenced by agreement, which is based on Gissing 24 , requires some agreement between the parties which does not have to be in writing. However, it is expected to take place before the purchase (subsequent discussions are less important). Also, the assumption is that there are express discussions rather than emerging but unspoken intentions between the parties 25 . On the other hand, the common intention evidenced by conduct arises where there was no agreement to share beneficial ownership; thus, the courts will have to consider the conduct of the parties 26 . The conduct that Lord Bridge had in mind was based on 'direct contributions to the purchase price' such as payments towards initial purchase price or mortgage instalments. According to him, "it is at least extremely doubtful whether anything less will do"
27 . In addition a person claiming a common intention constructive trust needs to prove that he suffered detriment.
Rosset 28 illustrates the difficulties with proving common intention for those seeking an interest in the property 29 37 the House of Lords made another attempt to clarify the law in relation to family home trusts. However, it effected very little real change to the law; thus the previous cases are still needed in order to identify the situations in which people other than the legal owners can acquire an equitable interest in a property and also the circumstances in which parties who are joint owners of the legal estate will be eligible for more or less than an equal share in the equitable interest in the home 38 . The majority of judges in Stack 39 held that where there is no express trust declared, the court will look for the common intention of the parties to establish the equitable ownership of the home. If the legal title is in joint names, the presumption will be that the equitable interest is similarly held in joint names; if the legal title is held in one person's sole name, the presumption will be that the equitable interest will be owned by that person 40 . It is important to note that each presumption may be rebutted on evidence to the contrary either before or after property was purchased. 65 . 57 Ibid, at 824. 58 The law on resulting trusts presumed that where a husband passed a property to his wife, he intended to make a gift to her (presumption of advancement). This presumption was used by earlier generation of judges in relation to the family home. 59 66 . Hence he argued, and it was the view of the majority, that the court should only be concerned with the identification of parties' real intention rather than imputing it with reference to what the parties would have decided had they thought about the matter 67 . The importance of the decision in Pettitt 68 lies in the fact that it began the process of staking out a modern code of rules to deal with the allocation of equitable interests in the family home 69 .
Gissing v Gissing [1970]
The facts of the case were that the parties had been married since 1935. Mrs Gissing worked throughout the marriage as a secretary at a firm of printers. In 1946, Mrs Gissing obtained employment for Mr Gissing with the firm where she worked. In 1951, couple bought a house in the husband's sole name. The purchase price was predominantly paid by a mortgage in husband's name; however, Mrs Gissing contributed to the furniture. Mr Gissing left her in 1961 for another woman. Consequently, the wife sought a declaration that she had an equitable interest in the property. The Court of Appeal held by majority that the wife was entitled to a halfshare in the house. However, the House of Lords reversed that decision and held that Mrs Gissing made no contribution to the acquisition of the matrimonial home and thus acquired no beneficial interest in the property.
In Gissing 70 , Lord Diplock held that Pettitt 71 was not correct because their Lordships found it impossible to impute a common intention where there was no evidence of any express agreement between parties 72 . He mentioned that in circumstances where the property was bought in a sole name of one of the spouse and there was no express agreement between spouses as to how the share of another spouse was to be quantified, "the court must first do its best to discover from the conduct of the spouses whether any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the probable common understanding about the amount of the share of the contributing spouse upon which each must have acted in doing what each did...it is only if no such inference can be drawn that the court is driven to apply as a rule of law, and not as inference of fact, the maxim 'equality is equity', and to hold that the beneficial interest belongs to the spouses in equal shares." 73 . Therefore Lord Diplock suggested that where the search for evidence of express intention in this regard proves inconclusive, the court might legitimately use the maxim that 'equality is equity' and award the parties equal shares in the property. Lord Walker noted that although Lord Diplock used the word 'infer' rather than 'impute' in Gissing 74 , the substance of the reasoning was essentially the same as Lord Diplock's reasoning in Pettitt 75 where he was in minority 76 . In his article published in 2004, Rothertham argued that a failure to set clearer guidelines left the law in an unacceptably unpredictable state 77 . In addition, Lord Diplock apparently equated resulting and constructive trusts despite the fact that in Pettitt 78 he dismissed the resulting trust as old-fashioned and inappropriate 79 , and this according to Thompson, has later led to a conceptual confusion 80 . Hence it can be argued that Lord Diplock did not follow Lord Hodson's view from Pettitt 81 that the law should strive for certainty and not permit too much uncertainty.
Gissing 82 is the leading case that created the possibility of looking behind the formal arrangements between the parties to uncover their common intentions as to the allocation of rights in their home 83 . Hudson noted that, "this decision has become the central text in this area, which establishes the principle that the common intention of the parties is to be taken as the root of any equitable interest in the property"
84
. Also, the adoption of language 'common intention' by Lord Diplock allowed the use of the constructive trust for the granting of rights in land, rather than the resulting trust which would grant only an equitable interest in proportion to the plaintiff's contribution to the purchase price 85 . According to Mee, Lord Diplock in Gissing 86 developed the unprincipled and convoluted common intention doctrine in a well-meaning attempt to give more discretion to judges and to improve the claimants' chances of establishing an equitable interest in the property 87 .
Even though there have been many cases in House of Lords and Court of Appeal following Gissing
88 , all judges have used Gissing 89 as a starting point for judgments albeit they tend to contradict one another 90 .
Cowcher v Cowcher [1971]
The case law that surrounded the decision in Gissing 91 offered a dispersed reading of the nature of the constructive trust. In Cowcher v Cowcher, 92 Bagnall J sought to conceptualise the different approaches to the form of constructive trust used in cases of common intention. 93 The facts of the case were that a married couple bought a house for £12,000 in 1963. The house was conveyed to the husband's sole name. It was agreed that wife should be treated as having provided £4,000, which was paid in cash. The remaining £8,000 was borrowed by the husband from LMAC secured by a mortgage of the house and a 25-year endowment policy on the life of the husband. The wife paid some instalments when husband was unable to do so. The marriage was dissolved in 1971 and the wife claimed a half share in the house whereas the husband contended that she was entitled only to one-third. It was held by the court that wife was only entitled to one-third of the proceeds 94 97 . Thus he asserted the position of Lord Reid from Pettitt 98 who was also against imputation of parties' intentions. He argued that although a decision might appear to be 'unfair', it did not make it 'unjust' 99 . Furthermore, it was held that the concepts of constructive and resulting trusts could be taken to be synonymous 100 and the nature of the common intention formed between the parties was said to be either as the equitable interest which each party would receive, which would be derived from the conduct of the parties if no express agreement could be proved ('interest consensus), or as to the size of the contribution which each party would make towards the purchase price of the property ('money consensus ') 101 . The 'money consensus' is not derived from conduct, but rather is based on express agreement to the amount of money paid by each party 94 towards the purchase price of the property 102 . This type of common intention constructive trust is a mixture of a resulting trust which looks at the parties' contributions to the purchase price of the property and a constructive trust which looks at the conscionability of allowing one party to take an unfair benefit from the understanding between the parties as to ownership of the property 103 . Therefore, Bagnall J did not only hold that constructive and resulting trusts could be taken to be synonymous but he also divided the concept of 'common intention' into 'money consensus' and 'interest consensus'. Moreover, he supported the position of Lord Reid from Pettitt 104 on imputation of parties' intention. According to Hudson 105 , the approach from Cowcher 106 had not been followed explicitly for some time until the decision of the Court of Appeal in Midland Bank v Cooke 107 .
Grant v Edwards [1986]
The decision in Grant v Edwards 108 offered a different reading of the concept of 'common intention' to the previous cases. Chadwick LJ described it as 'an important turning point' that provided a 'helpful guidance' 109 , while Gibson LJ found the judgment 'particularly helpful and illuminating' 110 . What is more, it was referred to with 'obvious approval' in Lloyds Bank v Rosset 111 and in Midland Bank v Cooke 112 . In this case, the plaintiff who was separated from the husband set up home with the defendant. The house was conveyed into the joint names of the defendant and his brother, who had no beneficial interest in the property and had been joined solely for the purpose of assisting in obtaining a mortgage on property. The defendant told the plaintiff that the reason why the title to a house was not taken in their joint names was because it would cause her prejudice in the matrimonial proceedings which were pending against her husband. The plaintiff made substantial contributions to the general household expenses. The parties separated in 1980 and the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest in the house. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was entitled to a half interest in the house.
Nourse LJ explained that, "the facts appear to me to raise a clear inference that there was an understanding between the plaintiff and the defendant... that the plaintiff was to have some sort of proprietary interest in the house" 113 . In 2009, Barnes 114 concluded that this approach was clearly based on an objective assessment of intention that was described by Lord Diplock in Gissing 115 . The somewhat heretical conclusion in this case was that it is possible that purely personal acts will be evidence of a 'common intention' 116 . Browne-Wilkinson VC held that, "the plaintiff has acted to her detriment in reliance on the common intention that she had a beneficial interest in the house and accordingly she has established such beneficial interest" 117 
Conclusion
The cases prior to Lloyds Bank v Rosset 129 offered a variety of readings of the concept of 'common intention,' which were often contradictory.
Pettitt v Pettitt
130 was the first case that began the process of staking out the modern codes of rules to deal with the allocation of equitable interests in the family home while Gissing v Gissing 131 introduced the concept of 'common intention' and provided courts with the possibility of looking behind the formal arrangements between the parties to uncover their common intentions as to the allocation of property rights in their home. The cases post -Gissing 132 such as Cowcher v Cowcher 133 and Grant v Edwards 134 prove that the common intention constructive trust played 'fast and loose' with a variety of concepts borrowed from proprietary estoppel, constructive trusts, and resulting trusts and there were no clear principles and guidelines to be followed 135 . They emphasise the inconsistency and unpredictability of the law surrounding family home trusts before Rosset 136 .
DEVELOPMENTS IN LLOYDS BANK V ROSSET AND POST-ROSSET

Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1990]
As opposed to the earlier cases, the House of Lords decision in Lloyds Bank v Rosset 137 provided a more rigid statement of the nature of the common intention constructive trust, which both tided and confused this area of law 138 . The case concerned a married couple who purchased a semi-derelict farmhouse. The property was put in the husband's sole name but the house was to be a family home and renovated as a joint venture. The wife oversaw all of the building work. Mr Rosset acquired the property with a mortgage registered in his sole name while Mrs Rosset had been led to believe that the property was to be acquired without it. Mr Rosset was unable to repay the loan and the bank sought repossession of the property. Mrs Rosset claimed to have an equitable interest in it. It was held that Mrs Rosset acquired no equitable interest in the house because activities such as supervising renovation work were not enough to acquire equitable interest 139 141 . Hence, Lord Bridge accepted that common intention could arise from some agreement between parties but he noted that discussions sufficient to constitute such 'agreement' are expected to have been carried out before the purchase of the property. Also, the assumption is that there are express discussions rather than "emerging but unspoken intentions between the parties" 142 . Hudson commented that this approach does not recognise the reality of relationships in which couples go through a variety of life experiences 143 . Lord Bridge said that in the absence of an express agreement to share beneficial ownership, "the court must rely entirely on the conduct of the parties both as the basis from which to infer a common intention to share the property beneficially and as the conduct relied on to give rise to a constructive trust"
144 . Therefore, the parties' conduct can give rise to establishing common intention. The only 'conduct' that he had on mind were direct contributions to the purchase price because "it is at least extremely doubtful whether anything less will do" 145 ; thus supervising renovation works is not sufficient. It can be argued that the type of 'conduct' envisaged by Lord Bridge is very limited 146 . In addition, before the claimant can demonstrate any type of common intention constructive trust, he needs to prove that he suffered detriment 147 
Huntingford v Hobbs [1992]
After the decision in Lloyds Bank v Rosset 156 'there has been a splintering of the doctrines into many mini-doctrines" 157 . In Huntingford v Hobbs 158 , the Court of Appeal presented a 'balance sheet approach,' which allowed the court to calculate parties' equitable interests in the home based on the list of their financial contributions towards the property. This approach differed from the one in Rosset 159 because parties' contributions could be made after the acquisition of the estate and did not have to be directed solely at acquiring interests in it 160 . The plaintiff and the defendant were not married but lived together. The defendant was divorced and had been living in her former matrimonial home. The plaintiff was a music teacher and moved in to live with the defendant. Not long after that parties decided to sell the house and move to a different one. They bought a property for £63,250; the defendant provided £38,860 from the proceeds of sale of her home and a joint mortgage for £25,000 was taken out. The defendant did not have any income and the plaintiff paid for most of the household bills and mortgage repayments. In 1988, the plaintiff left the defendant to marry another woman. The plaintiff claimed a joint tenancy on the basis of the terms of conveyance. The County Court held that the plaintiff's equitable interest in the property equalled £3,500; hence, the plaintiff appealed.
Slade 163 . Thus he straightforwardly looked at the amounts of financial contributions by the parties towards the property but as opposed to Rosset 164 , not only contributions to the acquisition were taken into account but also subsequent expenditure such as money spent on the conservatory after the purchase of property. The 'balance sheet approach' was primarily based on resulting trust principles but the subsequent changes of intention were effected by means of constructive trust 165 .
Hudson concluded that the Slade LJ's judgment "demonstrated an attitude based not on 'an abstract notion of justice' but on a rough approximation of what each party had contributed"
166 before and after acquisition while Norman in her article noted that in this case "equity appears to have been achieved" 167 . Hence, although the decision in this case differed substantially from the one in Rosset 168 , it found some academic support.
Midland Bank v Cooke [1995]
In this case the Court of Appeal once again visited the principle from Gissing 169 whereby one person can claim an equitable interest in a property legally owned by another 170 . Mr and Mrs Cooke purchased a house in the husband's sole name. The purchase price was funded by a mortgage (£6,450), Mr Cooke's cash contribution (£950) and a wedding gift 163 Huntingford v Hobbs [1992] 24 HLR 652 at 659-661. 164 (£1,100). They then replaced the mortgage by a different one and Mrs Cooke signed a consent form to subordinate any interest she might have to the bank's mortgage. The plaintiff demanded repayment of £52,000 and sought possession. Mrs Cooke claimed an equitable interest in the house to override bank's claim. The County Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for possession and held that Mrs Cooke's beneficial interest was 6.47 per cent of the house which reflected half of the gift from her parents-in-law (£500). Mrs Cooke appealed against the quantification of the beneficial interest and the plaintiff cross-appealed claiming that she had no interest in the property 171 .
Waite LJ said that, "[parties'] presumed intention was to share the beneficial interest in the property in equal shares. I reach this result without the need to rely on equitable maxim as to equality"
172 . Hence, the court determined that Mrs Cooke was entitled to an equal share in the house. Gardner argued that it is not clear whether Waite LJ pursued a fixed or floating analysis 173 . According to Lord Diplock in Gissing 174 , if there is no express agreement between parties as to the quantum of their shares, the court must look for an implied agreement which may take the form either that the parties' shares should be fixed or they should float and be quantified by the court which may decide it on the basis of fairness.
Waite eficial interest at first place 179 . Thus, once the existence of a common intention is inferred from a contribution made towards the acquisition of the property, all sorts of contributions to the relationship (not only financial ones) can be considered when quantifying the plaintiff's interest 180 . This is a 'family assets approach', which goes beyond the approach in Rosset
181
. Waite LJ's reasoning is not technically persuasive 182 . It is based mainly on assertion that it is of the nature of equity that in such circumstances the arrangement could be imputed, even if there was none. This is contradictory to Lord Diplock's judgment from Gissing 183 , where he held that judge must not invent a constructive trust 184 . Dixon noted that Waite LJ's finding is remarkable and hardly supported by authority -"it repeats the heresy perpetrated by Lord Diplock in Pettitt v Pettitt which he then retracted in Gissing v Gissing" 185 . He argued that decision in Cooke 186 has done little to clarify the law of resulting and constructive trusts, 187 
while Rotherham said that, "the end result of Midland Bank v Cooke is a highly arbitrary state of affairs"
188 .
Oxley v Hiscock [2004]
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Oxley v Hiscock 189 was based on an 'unconscionability approach' which allowed the courts to allocate equitable interests in the home without the need to base their findings on a common intention 190 . In this case, 192 . Thus Chadwick LJ divided the property in the ratio 60:40 in favour of Mr Hiscock. He argued that in order for the claimant to establish a constructive trust, the claimant had to prove a common intention (express or implied) to share an interest in the property owned by the defendant, along with the evidence of his reliance on that intention. According to Gardner, the sorts of evidence that Chadwick LJ had on his mind were direct contributions to the purchase price. As regards quantification, Chadwick LJ said that in cases where quantum is not dictated by common intention it should be determined by principles of proprietary estoppel and the court should award a fair share for each party having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to that property and this included arrangements to meet the outgoings such as mortgage contributions, repairs or house-keeping. Since in Oxley 193 there has been no such common intention, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel applied 194 . Chadwick LJ noted that, "there is no difference in outcome, in cases of this nature, whether the true analysis lies in constructive trust or in proprietary estoppel" 195 . Hence, he attempted to assimilate the principles underlying constructive trust with proprietary estoppel 196 . The Oxley 197 test applies only where parties had a common intention to share a beneficial interest in the property but had no common intention as to the size of their shares 198 . According to Chadwick LJ, reference to common intention to the quantum of the parties' interests is commonly "artificial and an unnecessary fiction" 199 and the court can impute it, which is not a permissible approach under Gissing v Gissing 200 . Chadwick LJ's approach never involved an abandonment of the search for common intention. It was only in a situation where there was no evidence of any discussion between the parties as to the amount of the share which each was to have 201 
Both decisions in Midland Bank v Cooke
207 and in Oxley 208 illustrate the judicial attempt to provide judges with the greater discretion. However, although some discretion is inevitable in deciding individual cases, "a systematically discretionary approach to the declaration of proprietary rights seems incongruous with the very basis of property law" 209 . Chadwick LJ's approach appears to be more remedial rather than institutional like traditional constructive trusts. It is distinctly different from the Rosset 210 test, 'balance sheet approach' or 'family assets approach'. As opposed to Rosset 211 and 'balance sheet cases', the 'unconscionability approach' and 'family assets approach' is concerned with a survey of all of the material circumstances, not only financial contributions. In addition, it was not possible to impute common intention under Rosset 212 where the court perceived it as 'fair' in a given situation 213 . Although Gray and Gray hailed Oxley 214 as an 'important breakthrough' 215 , Hudson argued that it is intellectually unsustainable to merge two radically different approaches into one test "whereby one looked first for an agreement between parties and then at the whole course of dealing if no such agreement could be found."
216 . He also noted that Rosset 217 did not intend to permit such a broad survey to be undertaken by the court 218 .
Conclusion
Although the test set out in Rosset 219 was very clear, the courts have not slavishly followed it. Hudson noted that Lord Bridge appeared to forget that people fall in love and go through a variety of life experiences. He also argued that the test in Rosset 220 is contrary to the equity's flexible ability to consider cases on the case-by-case basis. Consequently, the Court of Appeal moved in a number of different directions presenting a range of more flexible approaches 221 . In Huntingford v Hobbs 222 , the Court of Appeal presented a 'balance sheet approach,' which differed from Rosset 223 because parties' financial contributions could be made after the acquisition of the estate and did not have to be directed solely at acquiring interests in it 224 . In Midland Bank v Cooke 225 Waite LJ took a 'family assets approach,' which placed an obligation on the courts to survey the whole course of dealing of the parties with no need to solely rely on the limited range of acts of direct contribution required for establishing a beneficial interest at first place 226 . However in Oxley v Hiscock 227 which was based on an 'unconscionability approach' Chadwick LJ held that where parties have a common intention to share a beneficial interest in the home but have no common intention as to the size of their shares 228 , courts may allocate equitable interests in that property without the need to base their findings on a common intention 229 . It can be argued that the significant number of conflicting doctrines established after Rosset 230 indicated that the state of law surrounding family home trusts remained ambiguous and required further clarification.
DEVELOPMENTS IN STACK V DOWDEN
Stack v Dowden [2007]
Although the decision of the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden 231 was truly ground-breaking 232 and "made the newspapers and the headlines on BBC Radio 4 news,"
233 it did not overrule any of the preceding law 234 . The case concerned an unmarried couple who cohabited for 27 years. Ms Dowden was a successful engineer and Mr Stack a builder and decorator. The first house they lived in had been bought in Ms Dowden's sole name. They later sold it and bought a property in their joint names. The purchase was financed as to 65 per cent by Ms Dowden and as to 35 per cent by a mortgage. Ms Dowden paid off about 60% of the capital on the mortgage while Mr Stack paid for the mortgage interest instalments. They both had separate bank accounts. When they separated, the issue arose as to whether they were equitable joint tenants. The trial judge said that they were joint tenants. The Court of Appeal held that Mr Stack was only entitled to a 35 per cent share; hence he appealed. The House of Lords upheld the judgment that the equitable interest in the house should be divided in the ratio 65:35 in favour of Ms Dowden 235 .
In Stack 236 , their Lordships placed an emphasis on ascertaining the parties' common intention in disputes over cohabited homes 237 . Speaking for the majority, Baroness Hale took the view that, where there is no express trust declared the court will look for the common intention of the parties to establish the equitable ownership of the home. If the legal title to a cohabited home is in joint names, the presumption will be that the equitable interest is similarly held in joint names; if the legal title is held in one person's sole name, the presumption will be that the equitable interest is owned by that person 238 . It is important to note that each presumption may be rebutted on evidence to the contrary either before or after property was purchased. All of the law prior to Stack 239 is still relevant when identifying the situations in which parties' equitable shares can be greater or less than an equal share in that beneficial interest, and also when identifying situations in which people other than legal owners can acquire equitable interest in the property 240 . Baroness Hale noted that she would be prepared to impute intention if necessary 241 . Lord Walker concluded that there is no meaningful distinction between inferring and imputing intention and both are acceptable while Lord Neuberger in his dissenting judgment argued that there is a clear difference between these two concepts and that courts cannot impute intention to parties when resolving property disputes over cohabited homes 242 . Therefore, it can be argued that the court failed to define its clear stance in relation to "inferring" and "imputing" common intention.
Baroness Hale said that when searching for the parties' common intention to hold a property as equal beneficiaries, the court should not only take into account their financial contributions in relation to property but also other factors, for instance, the purpose for which the home was acquired, the nature of parties' relationship, or how the purchase was financed 243 . However, Baroness Hale argued that, "financial factors weighted more heavily than any other factor" 244 . Thus she emphasised the importance of financial contributions.
The majority in Stack 245 "sent out mixed messages about whether the common intention constructive trust found by them was an institutional constructive trust or a remedial one" 246 . Baroness Hale speaking for the majority, rejected the approach of Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock 247 that each party is entitled to a "share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of the dealing between them in relation to the property" 248 and this could indicate that their Lordship placed the case within the institutional model. Nonetheless, the references of Lord Walker and Baroness Hale to the relevance of 'imputed' intentions and bargain of the parties are inconsistent with an institutional trust 249 . Hence, the common intention constructive trust found by the court was neither institutional nor remedial but could be considered as a mixture of both.
Baroness Hale who delivered the leading speech took an approach of a family lawyer but it was Lord Walker who had the most experience of trust law. According to Hudson the fact that he decided to delete most of his draft opinion was a 'tragedy'. Lord Walker presented his judgment as a footnote to the judgment of Baroness Hale. Some of the interesting ideas that he presented were that the trusts of homes would not gravitate towards contract law nor towards unjust enrichment but rather it would remain a question for trusts law. He argued that it was not a good idea for the court to make 'such a change' before the long expected Law Commission proposals 250 constructive trust was incorrect while the doctrine of resulting trust was of limited usefulness in this context. He accepted the fact that the law has moved on from the strict test established in Rosset 251 towards unconscionability approach and consideration of the whole course of dealing between the parties 252 . Swadling in his article argued that "it is certainly a pity that the issue of resulting trusts was not more fully ventilated" by their Lordships 253 . Lord Neuberger in his dissenting judgment held that the case should be decided on the resulting trust principles however this notion was not supported by the majority in the House of Lords. He suggested that courts should begin with resulting trust analysis based on parties' financial contributions and then proceed with constructive trust principles to reflect parties' common intention that might have changed while they were occupying the property. Hence his idea was similar to the judgment in Huntingford v Hobbs; however, he failed to explain the basis on which constructive trust principles would operate 254 
James v Thomas [2007]
In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the strength of the Stack 261 presumption in relation to sole legal ownership 262 . In 1989, Miss James and Mr Thomas formed a relationship and Miss James moved into 'The Cottage' which was registered in Mr Thomas's sole name. At the outset of the relationship, Miss James gave Mr Thomas £5000 to pay a tax bill and soon after moving in, she began working in Mr Thomas's business which he ran from The Cottage; she received no remuneration for her work. She also helped him with the renovation works on the property. When they separated, Miss James claimed an equal share in the property. 263 . He suggested that the claimant might rebut the presumption of the sole ownership and the constructive trust could arise after the acquisition of the property; thus he followed Gissing 264 . However, he noted that without an express agreement, the court would be careful with inferring the parties' common intention as regards their shares based solely on their conduct 265 .
Sir John Chadwick held that contributions made by Miss James to the business and the property, were not sufficient for the court to infer common intention because the facts were 'explicable on other grounds' 266 . Dyson in his article noted that this narrow approach of inferred common intention came from the decision in Rosset 267 . 
Fowler v Barron [2008]
In Fowler v Barron 269 the Court of Appeal had the first opportunity to challenge the age-old maxim that actions speak louder than words 270 . In 1987 Miss Fowler and Mr Barron decided to purchase a property. The house was transferred into their joint names without express agreement as to their respective equitable shares. The property cost £64,500 of which £35,000 was paid by way of mortgage taken in the parties' joint names. Mr Barron paid most of the mortgage instalments and all fixed costs associated with the property such as utility bills. Miss Fowler spent most of her income on children. The parties had drawn up mutual wills. Mr Barron and Miss Fowler were in an unmarried relationship until 2005 when they separated. The question arose as to their respective equitable shares in the house. The High Court held that Mr Barron was the sole beneficial owner based on a presumption of a resulting trust. Miss Fowler appealed on the basis that the judge should consider common intention constructive trust rather than resulting trust principles to determine whether she had a beneficial interest in the property. Mr Barron argued that he put the property in joint names because he intended Miss Fowler to have an interest in the determining parties' common intention, for instance, optional expenditure such as holidays, gifts or school trips 281 .
Conclusion
George in his article concluded that although Stack 282 recognised that the presumption is that the beneficial ownership mirrors legal ownership and explained how the beneficial interest should be quantified in cases where that presumption was rebutted, it did not answer three main questions. First, when should the court depart from the starting point that beneficial ownership reflects legal title? Second, is there a difference between sole-name and joint-name cases besides the fact that starting points are different? Third, are the judges allowed to impute parties' common intention 283 ? Therefore, the law in relation to family home trusts after Stack 284 was in many respects no clearer than it had been before that case was decided 285 . 292 . Nonetheless, the legislature did not implement Law Commission's proposals for legislative reform to deal with this matter; hence the legal uncertainty remained 293 . According to Doyle and Brown, one of the reasons why Parliament has been denied any serious opportunity of reforming this area of law is the fact that, "none of the major political parties wish to be perceived as devaluing the formalised institutions of marriage or civil partnership" 294 .
THE DECISION IN JONES V KERNOTT
Jones v Kernott [2011]
The decision of the Supreme Court in this case was highly anticipated by both practitioners and academics alike and seen as an opportunity to answer certain questions left post-Stack. 295 This case concerned an unmarried couple who bought a house in joint names for £30,000 with a contribution of £6,000 from Miss Jones; the remainder was financed by way of endowment mortgage. Mr Kernott contributed £100 per week to household expenses, with Miss Jones paying for everything else out of joint resources. The couple had two children. In 1993 the couple separated and Miss Jones took over the responsibility to pay the expenses associated with the disputed property while Mr Kernott cashed in a life insurance policy and purchased a new house. He made very little contribution to the maintenance of his two children. In 2006, Mr Kernott claimed an equitable interest in the disputed property. The judge at first instance held that the equitable interest in the property should be divided roughly in ratio 90:10 in favour of Miss Jones and this was later confirmed by the High Court. The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that this was a joint tenancy. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment from the Court of Appeal and restored the decision of the lower courts.
Lord Walker and Lady Hale delivered the leading judgment. They concluded that where there is no express trust declared, the courts would look for parties' common intention as to their equitable ownership in the property. The presumption would be that the beneficial interest mirrors legal ownership. However, it might be rebutted on the evidence to the contrary either before or after the property was purchased. If the common intention was not apparent from the facts of the case, the court would seek to objectively infer it from the evidence; if the evidence was not conclusive, the court would seek to achieve the fairness between the parties 296 . This methodology clearly precludes using resulting trusts in this area of law 297 . Lord Walker and Lady Hale confirmed that constructive trusts of the family home can be 'ambulatory' in nature as parties' intentions could change over time 298 . Lord Walker and Lady Hale with whose reasons Lord Collins agreed said that it was possible to infer from Miss Jones and Mr Kernott's behaviour that they had formed a common intention after their separation that the beneficial interests would differ from the legal title. Lord Wilson and Lord Kerr took the same view 299 . As regards imputation, it appears that Lord Walker and Lady Hale found it not permissible to impute common intention when deciding whether the beneficial interests were intended to differ from the legal title and Lord Collins supported this notion 300 . Even Lord Wilson noted that imputation of such common intention would "merit careful thought" 301 .
Lord Walker and Lady Hale, with whom Lord Collins agreed, suggested that it was possible to infer a common intention as to what the parties' respective beneficial interests would be. However, Lord Wilson and Lord Kerr argued that it was not possible to infer that parties had an actual common intention in relation to the quantum of their respective shares and they preferred to reach the equivalent result by means of imputation 302 . Lord Walker and Lady Hale would also be willing to reach this result by means of imputation had they believed that no common intention as to shares could be inferred 303 . Although all the judges appeared to accept the conceptual difference between inferring and imputing 304 , they had different opinions as to the practical significance of the distinction. Lord Walker, Lady Hale and Lord Collins suggested that the difference in practice between imputation and inference is not so great while Lord Kerr disagreed with their conclusion and Lord Wilson noted that such generalisation goes too far 305 .
quantification stage. As regards the second question, the court mentioned in obiter dicta that although the starting points in the sole-name and jointname cases are different, this "does not imply any difference in the analytical process" 308 . However as regards first question, George said that it remained unresolved because Jones 309 failed to specify what evidence counts in rebutting the presumption that beneficial ownership mirrors legal ownership. George concluded that many difficulties arising from Stack 310 are likely to remain because even though Jones 311 clarified how the quantification process works, it failed to provide an explanation as to when it is needed 312 . According to Doyle and Brown, Jones 313 provided a clear justification as to why resulting trusts do not play a role with family homes and clarified "the structure for finding a constructive trust, at least for cases where both parties have legal ownership" 314 . They mentioned that the minority was right when saying that there ought to be a clear demarcation between imputation and inference in practice as well as in theory. Although the outcome under either process can lead to the same result, this is not always the case. They argued that the lack of explicit reference to holistic factors which would be used for finding a constructive trust and for quantifying the equitable interest, was a "missed opportunity to bring a further clarification to the law in this respect" 315 . In their opinion, it was unclear how the concept of 'fairness' should be used to quantify an imputed intention once it is found. Doyle and Brown concluded that Jones 316 failed to clarify all the issues from Stack and created new areas of uncertainty 317 .
of the family home. In order to answer the research question, it has been necessary to consider the development of the law since the early cases of 343 , there remain areas of uncertainty in the law of trusts of the family home. It is submitted that until Parliament undertakes the task of implementing legislative reform that would resolve cohabitation issues, "the courts will struggle to resolve adequately the property disputes that can arise in the event of relationship breakdown"
344 .
